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Abstract
For the last several decades, governments around the world have tried to
use so-called voluntary programs to motivate private firms to act proactively to
protect the environment. Unlike conventional environmental regulation, voluntary
programs offer businesses flexibility to adopt cost-effective measures to reduce
environmental impacts. Rather than prodding firms to act through threats of
enforcement, they aim to entice firms to move forward by offering various kinds of
positive incentives, ranging from public recognition to limited forms of regulatory
relief. Despite the theoretical appeal of voluntary programs, their proper role in
government’s environmental toolkit depends on the empirical evidence of how
these programs work in practice. This paper offers a comprehensive empirical
overview of voluntary programs’ design and impact. It shows that not all voluntary
programs are the same. Rates of business participation in voluntary programs
depend on a variety of factors, including both how these programs are designed as
well as, importantly, what kinds of relevant background regulatory threats may
loom for business. Although governments and policy advocates sometimes urge
voluntary programs as a substitute for conventional government regulation, it
appears that the most effective voluntary programs depend on a robust backdrop of
community pressure and regulatory threats. Studies that find these programs yield
statistically discernible effects on firm behavior generally find only substantively
small impacts, suggesting that at best voluntary programs can serve as a modest
supplement to government regulation.
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Motivating without Mandates:
The Role of Voluntary Programs in Environmental Governance
Cary Coglianese* and Jennifer Nash**

Is it possible for governments to foster better environmental performance
simply by encouraging firms to take steps to do so, without ever requiring them to
do so? Since the mid-1980s, governments around the world have been attracted to
the potential for voluntary environmental programs to coax private sector firms to
reduce pollution and save natural resources. These programs attempt to change
private sector behavior not by requiring compliance with mandatory regulations,
but by offering often modest incentives, such as access to information and positive
public recognition. They might even be said to try to nudge business managers
toward socially desired behavior without imposing a heavy hand of governmental
control.1
Voluntary programs hold great appeal. State and federal governments in the
United States operate perhaps as many as 200 voluntary environmental programs,
and upwards of 300 exist throughout the European Union.2 In the United States, the
federal Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) has created a veritable
smorgasbord of such programs, ranging from voluntary product labeling systems,
such as its well-known Energy Star program that promotes energy-efficient product
design,3 to public recognition programs, such as US EPA’s highly-trumpeted
“33/50” program that in the 1990s gave public recognition to companies that made
commitments to reduce releases of toxic chemicals.4 For many years, the US EPA’s
flagship voluntary program was its National Environmental Performance Track that
offered public recognition and modest regulatory relief to facilities that made
several “beyond-compliance” environmental commitments.5
The theoretical appeal of governmental voluntary environmental programs
is seductive. We begin this chapter, therefore, by summarizing the theoretical
advantages of voluntary programs, but we also consider some of their potential
limitations. After showing how the design of these programs can vary greatly, we
review what researchers know about how effective these programs can be in
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reducing environmental degradation and risks. Voluntary programs’ effectiveness
depends primarily on two factors: the number of firms that will participate in them
and the average effect for each participant.6 In addressing the first of these, we
consider what we know about why firms decide to join voluntary programs:
principally, to stave off the costs of regulatory compliance, appeal to customers and
other external interests, and fulfill managers’ own values. These motivations, we
show, have proven insufficient to persuade any large fraction of polluting firms to
join voluntary programs, let alone invest in major, costly environmental
improvements. As a result, the impacts of voluntary programs are mixed, with at
best some evidence of small, positive results from a few programs. Surprisingly,
given voluntary programs’ seductive appeal of motivating firms without costly
mandates, their performance in practice is such that their role can amount to little
more than a minor supplement to mandatory regulations. Research to date indicates
that voluntary programs work best when government possesses the capacity, and
expends the resources needed, to verify members’ claims of voluntary
accomplishments—and ultimately when mandatory regulation looms in the
background as a viable threat.
Theoretical advantages and disadvantages
The idea of motivating without mandates holds considerable appeal because
environmental regulation and its enforcement are costly—not just for industry, but
also for government. The US EPA’s budget included more than $790 million for
compliance and enforcement activities in FY 2015, approximately 10 percent of its
budget overall.7 The costs of complying with environmental regulations—borne by
private sector firms as well as governments at the local, state, and federal levels—
has been estimated at $200 billion annually in the United States alone.8 Since
regulations can sometimes be over-inclusive—one size hardly always fits all—
alternative approaches to environmental governance promise significant cost
savings. After all, voluntary programs are voluntary. Firms can choose their own
means of environmental control, seeking the lowest cost strategies to improve the
environment.
Voluntary programs also purportedly cost less for government agencies to
implement, as firms can be required to come forward to provide documentation of
their voluntary accomplishments. Especially during periods of political gridlock
and fiscal austerity, these programs constitute an attractive option for addressing
perceived gaps in the existing regulatory system, whether to address the problems
of climate change, toxic contamination, natural resource shortages, or species
extinction.
Voluntary programs also promise to reduce the level of conflict between
business and government that seems to pervade most regulatory fields today,
6
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fostering an ethic of shared responsibility for protecting the environment.9 Because
voluntary programs merely suggest, rather than dictate, activities that firms can take
to protect the environment, they have won widespread support from both
governments and industries, with support often cutting across political ideologies.
Governments can also often create voluntary programs through administrative
action, foregoing the lengthy and contentious process of legislative review and
approval.10
In addition, some proclaim that voluntary programs can encourage privatesector managers to think critically about ways to improve their environmental
performance, prompting discovery of environmental protection activities that are
in their self-interest.11 They are opportunities, in other words, for the promotion of
win-win solutions to environmental sustainability. They can leverage the deep,
firsthand knowledge that private-sector managers have about where the greatest or
most cost-effective opportunities for environmental improvement lie.12 Many
programs also create opportunities for information sharing among firms, as well as
with government, thereby facilitating the diffusion of best environmental
practices.13
These theoretical benefits of voluntary programs are clearly significant. Of
course, they are also counter-balanced with some potential limitations and
disadvantages too. Even if voluntary programs are relatively less costly for
government to administer, if conventional regulatory programs are in fact more
effective, then any investments in voluntary programs might be ill-advised. After
all, the governmental costs of voluntary programs are not trivial. In 2006, for
example, US EPA spent approximately $352 million on program advertising and
recruitment, application processing, grants, and overall administration of its
voluntary programs.14
Some worry that voluntary programs not only divert fiscal resources but
also dampen the political case for more effective policies. They could create an
impression that important problems are being addressed in a win-win fashion, thus
taking the pressure off politicians to make tough regulatory decisions. At a more
operational level, voluntary programs might also misallocate inspection resources
as they demand that government officials give more of their time and attention to
responsible firms instead of targeting for scrutiny those firms that pose the greatest
health and environmental risks.15 Worse yet, if they are not carefully designed and
administered, voluntary programs might also perversely recognize and reward the
wrong firms, putting government in a role of supporting industry “greenwashing.”16
9
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Variability among programs
These theoretical benefits and limitations of voluntary programs point to the
need for empirical research on what these programs accomplish in practice. Any
such research must first begin with understanding how these programs are
designed. It is true, of course, that all voluntary programs share a common purpose:
to encourage firms and other entities to improve their environmental performance
through incentives rather than regulatory threats. But they also differ widely in the
way they are designed and the types of incentives they offer.
Voluntary programs can be grouped into three main types: public voluntary
programs (where governments define program requirements and invite firms to
join), negotiated agreements (where firms and governments jointly define
environmental requirements through negotiation), and unilateral agreements
(where trade associations or firms themselves define requirements for their
environmental activities, without any direct input from government).17 Public
voluntary programs and negotiated agreements are the primary focus of this
chapter, as we are concerned with understanding better the role of voluntary
programs in government’s environmental policy portfolio.
Governments often create voluntary programs to address environmental
problems not yet covered by regulation. Some of the first voluntary programs, for
example, targeted unregulated uses and releases of toxic chemicals from
manufacturing firms.18 And today, many programs encourage reductions in
greenhouse gases that have escaped regulatory control.19 Some programs encourage
facilities to improve overall environmental performance by adopting environmental
management systems, which are not currently required in most jurisdictions.20
Other programs, such as Energy Star in the United States, focus on adoption of
energy saving technologies.
Governments offer a range of incentives to encourage firms to join
voluntary programs. The most common incentive is access to information, whether
through opportunities for peer-to-peer sharing, meetings with high-ranking

17
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officials, or technical assistance to members.21 Some programs offer grants to
encourage new environmental management techniques. Some European
governments provide tax rebates to firms that voluntarily agree to improve their
energy efficiency.22
For many programs, the primary incentive is governmental recognition that
the business is an environmental ‘leader’.23 Leadership recognition sometimes
takes place through affirmative publicity that hails specific businesses on agency
websites and press releases. It also comes about by authorizing marketing logos and
product labeling. Increasingly, governments use public voluntary programs to
encourage manufacturers to improve the environmental performance of their
products—the incentive for programs of this type is usually a product label.24
Some voluntary programs also offer regulatory benefits such as reduced
regulatory oversight or exemption from certain reporting or other administrative
requirements.25 The US National Environmental Performance Track program, for
example, applied more relaxed standards under hazardous waste laws to qualifying
facilities and also promised these facilities a reduction in enforcement scrutiny.26
Voluntary programs vary widely with respect to other aspects of their
design. Some programs set more ambitious requirements for entry and ongoing
participation than others. Some monitor participants’ adherence to program
commitments more closely than others, sometimes through third-party auditing.
Others require that members disclose information about their performance or
impose sanctions, including removal from the program, on those who fall behind.
Of course, a number of programs have only ‘weak’ entry requirements and soft
oversight.27
The variations in design elements make it difficult to generalize about all
voluntary programs. The way they are designed can be expected to make some
more effective than others. But what exactly does it mean for a voluntary program
to be effective? Effectiveness is generally understood to be a function of two
principal factors: the number of firms that choose to participate, and the average
effect for each participant, as shown in Figure 1.28 Unless the average effect is
profound, the ability of these programs to attract members will be a critical variable.
If voluntary programs are little known or do not induce many firms to change their
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behavior to qualify for entry into the program, then these programs will at best only
have marginal overall effects on the environment.
Figure 1. Factors determining the effectiveness of voluntary programs

Source: Borck and Coglianese (2009) 310.
Drawing on studies from the United States, Europe, and developing countries, the
remainder of this chapter reports what researchers have learned about these two
factors—both why some firms choose to participate, and how participation affects
their environmental performance.
Why firms join
Policymakers seeking to design voluntary programs that will have a
significant impact need to understand what makes membership appealing to
businesses. Researchers have used multiple approaches to explore firms’
motivations: theoretical modeling, econometric analysis, and qualitative research.
One reason firms participate in voluntary programs is to stave off or reduce
the cost of regulatory compliance. Segerson and Miceli developed modeling that
shows how a firm’s voluntary actions will increase as the threat of regulation
grows.29 Compared to mandatory regulation, a voluntary program lowers both
environmental protection costs for the firm and transaction costs for the regulator,
although the level of environmental protection achieved may also be lower.30 Selfinterested firms may use voluntary programs to deter consumer groups from
organizing for mandatory controls.31 By voluntarily committing to a high level of
environmental performance, firms may convince regulators to defer the
establishment of mandatory controls.32
Empirical evidence generally supports these predictions. Firms that join
voluntary programs tend to be larger, have higher levels of toxic releases, and be
subject to higher levels of regulation than non-participants.33 These are precisely
the kinds of firms whose compliance regulators are most likely to scrutinize
closely—and who might particularly value the regulatory benefits that voluntary
programs provide. These regulatory benefits have included substantive exemptions
as well as reduced inspection scrutiny. For example, US EPA granted regulatory
relief to firms that joined Project XL, a program in which the agency negotiated
agreements with individual firms under which the agency granted regulatory
29
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exemptions in exchange for the firms providing a demonstrated ability to achieve
superior environmental performance through other means.34 As already noted, one
of the benefits the US EPA offered members of its National Environmental
Performance Track program was designation as a low priority for routine federal
and state compliance inspections.35 Researchers have found that governments
inspect members of other voluntary programs less closely than non-members.36
Firms that joined the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 program, for example, experienced fewer
inspections and enforcement actions, even though the program did not explicitly
offer that benefit.37
In addition to gaining potential advantages in the ways governments
regulate, firms also join voluntary programs to appeal to customers and community
and environmental interest groups. Firms can benefit from sharing their positive
environmental achievements with consumers, customers, and investors, and
voluntary programs offer a way of boosting the credibility of their claims.38 In this
way, participation in voluntary programs helps firms reinforce a reputation for
environmental awareness and concern.39 Empirical research finds that participating
firms are indeed the ones more likely to spend more on advertising and that more
highly value customer goodwill, consistent with the expectation that these firms
view participation as a way to bolster their public image.40 Managers who recognize
stakeholder influences as important to their organizations report being more
interested in joining voluntary programs.41
A firm’s decision to join a voluntary program is also shaped by the
characteristics of the firm and its managers—in particular, the values and identities
of those responsible for determining whether to join a voluntary program. A firm’s
management style—its “expressed attitudes” about environmental problems,
relevant actions, and explanations of its environmental decisions—influence the
way managers interpret and act on regulatory requirements and demands from
external interests.42 Internal characteristics serve as a lens through which managers
make sense of what’s going on inside and outside their organizations. For some,
joining a voluntary program reinforces preexisting environmental leadership roles
and attitudes. For others, these programs have little relevance and are viewed as
“paperwork” that amounts to little more than “fluff.”43 A study of participants and
non-participants in the US EPA’s Performance Track found that participants were
distinguished by the level of internal management support for voluntary program
membership, the degree to which their organizations’ identity was linked to
34
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environmental excellence, and the value managers placed on displays of behavior
intended for those outside their organizations.44
Finally, a firm’s decision to join a voluntary program is affected by certain
features of the program itself, such as the stringency of its entry criteria and the
types of benefits it offers. Researchers have noted a “participation paradox” in
which programs that offer the greatest benefits tend to attract the fewest members.
This paradox is the result of governments’ tendency to set demanding admissions
requirements for programs that offer significant rewards—so demanding that few
firms appear interested to meet them.45 In a 1996 review of US EPA voluntary
programs, Davies and Mazurek attributed high participation rates in the agency’s
33/50 program to the ease with which firms were able to join, and they noted that
efforts to continue the program were unsuccessful when the agency sought to
impose additional eligibility criteria on firms.46
Most research on why businesses participate in voluntary programs has
focused on decisions about “partnership” voluntary programs, ones in which
governments specify entry requirements for firms to “join” a select group of
recognized businesses. Firms can be expected to participate in other kinds of
voluntary programs for similar reasons, although “product certification” voluntary
programs offer companies one additional incentive: potential market advantage if
consumers value the label available for qualifying products.
Although the US EPA’s most well-known product certification program,
Energy Star, boasts upwards of 16,000 participating businesses across 70 different
product categories, most other voluntary programs attract only a small percentage
of eligible firms. Only about 4,100 organizations participate in the European
Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, a voluntary program open to any
organization worldwide.47 At its peak in 2008, the US EPA’s Performance Track
program attracted about 575 members, out of a potential membership pool of
hundreds of thousands of facilities.48 In 2006, the combined membership of US
EPA’s 11 programs geared to reducing greenhouse gases amounted to about 2,900
businesses.49 Although several thousand participating companies may seem like a
lot, this is actually a tiny fraction of the millions of businesses that operate—and
affect the environment—in a country the size of the United States.
How participation impacts environmental performance
Assessing the impact of voluntary programs on environmental performance
presents several methodological challenges. The factors that lead firms to join
voluntary programs—sensitivity to regulatory, competitive, and social drivers, as
well as distinct internal characteristics—also shape their behavior once they
44
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become members. Separating the factors that caused them to join from the influence
of the voluntary program itself is difficult.50 Only rarely do governments establish
a baseline of performance before the program begins. While some programs collect
information on participants’ environmental performance over time—tracking
changes in their releases of greenhouse gases, for example—comparable
information is rarely available for non-participants.51 Nevertheless, some
researchers have begun to tackle the evaluation challenges using statistical analyses
of how participation affects behavior and certain measures of environmental
outcomes.
Experience in developed countries
The overall account of voluntary programs’ impacts on environmental
performance is modest and mixed. One of US EPA’s earliest voluntary programs,
the 33/50 program, has been the subject of numerous empirical studies. Khanna
and Damon found that participation in US EPA’s 33/50 program resulted in
reductions in toxic releases of about 28 percent during the program’s first three
years.52 Innes and Sam assessed the program over multiple years and also found
that the program reduced emissions, but primarily during 1991 and 1992.53 Vidovic
and Khanna, however, found that firms made most of the reductions attributed to
the program in the years prior to its inception, suggesting that members joined in
order to claim credit for actions already taken.54 Undertaking a more detailed
analysis, Gamper-Rabindran concluded that the program’s impact varied by
industry. In the chemical industry, for example, the beneficial impacts noted in
previous studies disappeared when two ozone-depleting chemicals were removed
from the analysis—as firms were required to phase out these chemicals under
binding rules called for in the Montreal Protocol.55
Voluntary programs appear to work best under threat of looming mandatory
regulation. Prior to launching the 33/50 program, US EPA had announced plans to
regulate most of the chemicals included in this program under the federal Clean Air
Act’s Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT) standards. By joining this
program, firms were able to reduce emissions of these chemicals in their own way,
at their own pace, while receiving recognition and technical assistance from US
EPA. Firms in states with strong environmental group membership had greater
reductions of 33/50 chemicals, perhaps because the threat of mandatory regulation
was higher in those states.56
50
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Improvements that can be attributed solely to voluntary programs tend to be
small—nearly indistinguishable in most cases from what might well have happened
anyway in the absence of these programs. Most of the gains attributed to US EPA’s
Strategic Goals Program were achieved prior to the program’s start date; only water
discharges fell continuously throughout the life of the program.57 The effect of US
EPA’s Climate Wise program on participant behavior appears to have been
temporary—just for at most one to two years.58 In both cases, the incentives US
EPA offered for joining these programs appear to have been insufficient to affect
participants’ behavior. (When surveyed, participants in US EPA’s Performance
Track program considered the rewards of that program to be quite small.59) Studies
of the US Climate Challenge found no difference between emissions reductions of
participants and non-participants, although some evidence suggests that late joiners
were free-riding on the contributions of those who joined early.60 A study of
implementation of voluntary programs in OECD countries concluded that, in most
cases, factors other than the voluntary program were likely responsible for any
observed improvements in environmental performance.61
In some cases, faulty implementation by governmental agencies have been
said to have undermined programs’ effectiveness. In assessing US EPA’s Project
XL, Marcus and his coauthors observed numerous practical impediments to
cooperation, including ambiguity in US EPA’s definition of “superior
environmental performance” (a requirement for US EPA to grant regulatory
flexibility, the program’s primary benefit), differences in parties’ goals, and
technical, economic, and legal uncertainties.62 Facing complaints from
participating businesses over the amount of time required to negotiate
agreements—on average more than 20 months—as well as concerns from
environmental advocacy organizations about the potential for environmental laxity
by companies granted flexibility under the program, US EPA stopped accepting
new Project XL proposals in 2003.63
Results of US EPA’s Common Sense
Initiative (CSI) show that it too fell far short of its ambitious goals, due in large
measure to the requirement that parties reach agreement through consensus.64 And
participants in the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Voluntary Greenhouse Gas
Registry have been said to have engaged in “highly selective reporting,” increasing
emissions while reporting reductions.65 Failure by US DOE to engage in more
careful monitoring of participants’ performance apparently allowed members to
shirk program responsibilities.
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The US EPA’s own analysis of its suite of voluntary programs presents a
mixed picture. US EPA’s Office of Inspector General reviewed the agency’s
partnership programs numerous times during the years 2005-2008.66 In a report
issued in 2006, the Inspector General optimistically indicated that partnership
programs such as Performance Track, Climate Leaders, WasteWise, and Energy
Star had the potential to expand the agency’s environmental influence by reaching
participants who do not typically interact with US EPA and by addressing
environmental problems not governed by regulations. But later that same year, the
Inspector General’s analysis of US EPA’s “flagship” voluntary program,
Performance Track, found that some participants in the “leadership” program
actually exceeded the sector average for both regulatory violations and toxic
releases, and that many Performance Track participants did not meet the
commitments they made to US EPA under the program.67 A subsequent review of
voluntary programs targeting greenhouse gases in 2008 found that, despite
recruitment efforts, too few firms were choosing to join these programs to achieve
meaningful emissions reductions.68
Voluntary programs aimed at improving the environmental performance of
products have received less attention by social scientists. The US EPA’s Inspector
General reviewed the Energy Star program annually in the years 2007 through
2010, finding that US EPA and US DOE had failed during that period to set clear
qualifying standards for products bearing the Energy Star label and had relied on
manufacturers to self-certify that products met government criteria.69 A 2010 report
by the US Governmental Accountability Office on Energy Star raised similar
concerns.70 US EPA and US DOE have subsequently tightened Energy Star
certification procedures. Clearly additional research is both possible and needed on
this program as with others.
Experience in developing countries
In developing countries, governments often lack the funding, know-how,
and even political will to develop and implement meaningful, mandatory
environmental regulations.71 Many firms are small, unlicensed, and difficult to
monitor.72 A growing number of researchers are exploring the potential for
voluntary programs to fill gaps in government and private sector capacities in these
countries.
Research suggests that firms in developing countries join voluntary
programs to reduce the cost of regulatory compliance and appeal to customers and
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interest groups—the same motivations for firms in developed countries.73 These
drivers are weaker in developing countries, though, where regulatory agencies lack
the resources they need to exert significant pressure, and where market pressures
for “green” practices and products remain relatively limited.74
In developed economies, voluntary programs serve mostly to encourage
firms to improve their environmental performance beyond what regulations require.
However, studies in Mexico75 and Colombia76 find little support that voluntary
programs lead to environmental performance improvement in the developing
world. For example, although Mexican regulators chose a public voluntary program
to address pollution from the Mexican tanning industry because of gaps in
regulatory, public, and civic infrastructure that rendered mandatory regulations
futile, those same gaps undermined the effectiveness of the voluntary program.77
Instead of seeking to induce beyond-compliance improvements in
environmental performance, developing countries have sometimes pursued
voluntary programs simply to reduce noncompliance with mandatory rules.78
Mexico’s Clean Industry Program exemplifies this approach. In order to participate,
firms must hire third-party auditors to identify areas of non-compliance with
environmental regulations and work with government to develop a plan to achieve
compliance. Upon completion of the plan, the government awards participating
facilities with “clean industry certificates” that entitle members to inspection
amnesty for two years.79 The program tended to attract larger, dirtier plants that
were subject to regulatory fines before joining the program. These plants were more
likely to sell products to overseas markets and government suppliers than nonmembers, and may have been subject to greater competitive pressures.80 After the
two-year amnesty period elapsed, members and non-members were equally likely
to be subject to regulatory fines, which might be a positive result if the member
plants were more likely to experience violations in the absence of the program.81
Chile has negotiated agreements with firms in a variety of sectors as part of
a national policy to improve regulatory compliance. Researchers attribute the
success of the program to Chile’s relatively robust environmental regulatory
program and the fact that the agreements included clear targets and deadlines,
monitoring by industry trade associations, and sanctions for non-compliance.82
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Impacts of ISO 14001 adoption
Up to now, we have focused solely on voluntary programs adopted and
implemented by government authorities. Other voluntary programs have been
established by trade associations and nongovernmental organizations, and the
lessons from these programs may well be instructive about the potential for
governments to achieve environmental gains without regulatory mandates. Some
government programs have even supported or encouraged participation in
nongovernmental voluntary programs or have been at least partly modeled on them.
ISO 14001 is perhaps the most well-known and extensively studied private
voluntary approach to environmental management. Facilities that comply with ISO
14001’s voluntary standards must establish internal environmental management
systems (EMSs) through which managers identify the environmental impacts of
their operations, develop goals to reduce those impacts, check progress toward
achieving their goals, and take corrective action when progress falls short. To meet
ISO’s standards, facilities must develop an environmental policy that calls for
compliance with regulations and continuous improvement. Facilities can become
certified to ISO 14001 by having a registered third party verify that their
environmental management system is consistent with the standard.
Firms that adopt ISO 14001 appear to be motivated by the same factors as
firms that adopt voluntary programs—they tend to be larger polluters and sell
products directly to consumers.83 A few studies have found statistically significant
positive results associated with facility adoption of the kind of environmental
management systems called for under ISO 14001. Darnall and Kim found that firms
that adopted EMSs reported levels of environmental performance relatively better
than non-adopters.84 Another study suggests that facilities that certify to ISO 14001
may be more likely to monitor the environmental performance of suppliers.85 And
Prakash and Potoski, in one the most sophisticated investigations to date, found that
ISO 14001 certification was associated with facilities spending less time out of
compliance as well as with some decreases in toxic releases.86 Even so, the impacts
of ISO certification tend to be substantively small. The ISO-certified facilities in
Prakash and Potoski’s study, for example, were on average out of compliance only
one week less than other facilities and, as Prakash and Potoski acknowledge, their
findings on toxic releases were “difficult to interpret” and reflected “not a very large
improvement.”87
Conclusion
Governments around the world have adopted voluntary environmental
programs since the mid-1980s. With the passage of time, a number of these
programs have been studied to understand their effectiveness, which will generally
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be understood to be a function both of the number of firms that choose to join the
program and the impact of the program on the participants. Both modeling and
empirical evidence suggests that firms join these programs to reduce the costs of
complying with regulation, to appeal to customers, and to respond to internal
organizational factors. The design of these programs also appears to matter; those
that offer the most benefits also impose the greatest requirements for entry and
ongoing participation—and tend, perhaps counter-intuitively, to attract the fewest
participants. Overall, participation in voluntary environmental programs is limited
to a very small fraction of businesses that contribute to environmental concerns.
When it comes to discerning effects of voluntary programs on business
behavior and environmental impacts, a few studies suggest that some programs are
associated with statistically significant improvements, but overall even these effects
tend to be very modest. When voluntary programs do seem to work best, it appears
they do so because they are reinforced by the presence of strong community
pressures and regulatory threats. Despite the allure of having government motivate
business without adopting mandates, it appears that not only are voluntary
programs unlikely to substitute for regulations, but also that whatever minor
impacts they have depends on the existence of mandates lurking in the background.
At most, the role for voluntary programs appears to be as a modest supplement to
government regulation.
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